Methodological Remarks

The classification of constitutional systems depends on their definition i.e. on the criteria by which they can be distinguished. The task is not an obvious one, because the interaction between norms and practices which underlies any constitutional system may lead classification in two main directions: that of practice and that of norm.

Practice is constituted by facts, it is the system in action. It is practice, in its relation with norms, that has served as a criterion in most traditional classifications. Such classifications are generally based on an assessment of the application or non-application, appropriate or non-appropriate, of the norms on the ground. Thus, as in Plato and Aristotle for example, such assessment lead to a contrast between democratic systems, aristocratic and tyrannical systems. Similarly, Montesquieu’s assessment of the degree of separation of powers led to a distinction between absolute monarchy and the republican system. However, practice, important as it is for various purposes, remains a political criterion which involves the risk of ideological classifications.

To avoid these risks, reference to norms seems to provide a more fixed and adequate criterion. By norms, we mean all codified or institutionalized structures which are reflected in formal texts or well-established unwritten conventional rules that frame the constitutional activity of a state. It should be noted, however, that while the use of norms as criterion has the advantage of allowing greater clarity in classification, constitutional norms are nevertheless largely the fruit and synthesis of certain facts and practices within states. The constitutional norm is not totally disconnected from facts. For classificatory purposes, this is in fact a further reason for giving precedence to the norms constituting and regulating the exercise of state powers, rather than to the ways in which these powers are actually exercised.

The exposition of our classification of constitutional systems is in great part similar to our previous study of legal systems in the world. A short, necessary reminder of that study is thus provided in the first section. We then expose a number of correlations between the distinct elements of constitutional systems, on the one hand and between those elements and legal systems and official languages, on the other.